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By WILLIAM H. FORTUNE* AND SARA.H N. WELLING**
INTRODUCTION
Significant criminal procedure decisions of the Kentucky
appellate courts for the period July 1, 1982 to July 1, 1983, have
been selected for discussion in this Survey. In addition, a number
of other cases merit brief comment. One such case was Blake v.
Commonwealth,' where the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
a minimum sentence could not be regarded as evidence that im-
proper comments by the prosecutor did not influence the jury.2
The Court stated: "[I]t is as reasonable to surmise from a minimum
sentence that the jury would have acquitted but for the unfair
attack upon the testimony as to conjecture that the minimum
sentence means that the jury disregarded the matter." 3
In Stamps v. Commonwealth,' the Kentucky Supreme Court
applied the test recently adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Oregon v. Kennedy,' and held that a new trial is barred
by the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitu-
tions only in cases where the prosecutor's conduct "was intended
to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial."' In addi-
tion, the Court applied the rationale of Rawlings v. Kentucky7
in the case of James v. Commonwealth.' When arrested, James
was carrying a gym bag, which he said had just been given to
him. The Court followed Rawlings and held that James had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag.9
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1961, J.D. 1964, University of
Kentucky.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1974, University of
Wisconsin; J.D. 1978, University of Kentucky.
646 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1983).
2 Id. at 719.
3Id.
648 S.W.2d 868 (Ky. 1983).
456 U.S. 667, 669 (1982).
6 648 S.W.2d at 869 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679).
7 448 U.S. 98 (1980). In Rawlings, the United States Supreme Court held that the
defendant had no "legitimate expectation of privacy" in his friend's purse, in which the
defendant had hidden drugs. Id. at 104.
647 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1983).
Id. at 795 (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 104).
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In Cope v. Commonwealth,1" the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that a defendant may not enforce a plea bargain unless he
has relied to his detriment on the bargain." Finally, in Turner
v. Commonwealth, 2 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that
the failure of the trial court to inform the defendant he would
not be eligible for parole for ten years did not render his guilty
plea subject to collateral attack.I3 The court relied on United States
v. Timmreck,'" and reasoned that a guilty plea is valid if the
accused is aware of the constitutional rights he is surrendering.s
The court found that a plea may be voluntary and informed even
though the accused is not aware of all the consequences of pleading
guilty. 6 The remainder of this Survey will provide more exten-
sive discussion of selected cases in the areas of warrants, com-
petency of counsel, pretrial discovery of witness statements, venue,
belated attacks on criminal convictions, and the right to talk to
an attorney before taking a breathalyzer test.
I. WARRANTS
A. Who May Issue Warrants?
The question of who has authority to issue arrest warrants
in Kentucky is not expressly covered by any constitutional or
statutory provision,' 7 nor is it covered by the Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RCr).' s Instead, the question has been left
10 645 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1983).
Id. at 704.
12 647 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
'3 Id. at 502.
14 441 U.S. 780 (1979).
' 647 S.W.2d at 501.
16 Id.
17 Richmond v. Commonwealth, 637 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Ky. 1982). Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15.725(4) (Cum. Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS] provides that circuit clerks
may issue criminal warrants if all district and circuit judges and trial commissioners are
absent from the county. Although this statute implies that district and circuit judges and
trial commissioners may issue warrants, it does not specifically so state and the Court
did not rely on this statute for its decision. See 637 S.W.2d at 645.
Is Ky. R. Cium. P. 2.04(1) [hereinafter cited as RCR] states: "If from an examina-
tion of the complaint it appears to the judge . . . that there is probable cause . . . he
shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant. . . ." This rule clearly seems to
establish that judges may issue arrest warrants, but the Court chose not to use it in its
decision. See 637 S.W.2d at 645.
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to the courts, which until 1982 had not addressed the issue.' 9 The
general assumption was that all judges who had power to hear
criminal matters also had power to issue arrest warrants.2
Similarly, Kentucky's constitution and statutes are silent on
the question of who may issue search warrants. 2' The state's rules
of criminal procedure do, however, state who has authority to
issue search warrants: "[A] search warrant may be issued by a
judge or other officer authorized by statute to issue search
warrants. ' 22 This rule has been construed as merely a restatement
of the common law and not as an independent source of authori-
ty regarding the issuance of search warrants. 23 As with arrest war-
rants, the general assumption has been that judges who have
authority to hear criminal matters could also issue search
warrants. 2
The Supreme Court of Kentucky answered the above questions
in Richmond v. Commonwealth.2" In Richmond, state police of-
ficers in Carrollton had, after a car chase, arrested Gregory Rich-
mond and his girlfriend on a February, 1979, Saturday afternoon,
for possession of cocaine. Richmond's car was impounded and
taken to a municipal garage in Carrollton. 26 The police attempted
to locate someone from their judicial district 27 who could issue a
search warrant for the car, but by then it was late Saturday night
and they were unsuccessful. 28 The police officers eventually con-
tacted a district judge from a different judicial district who traveled
" See Richmond v. Commonwealth, 637 S.W.2d at 645.
2 Id. The Court noted: "In the absence of any constitutional or statutory designa-
tion of what officers may issue warrants (whether for search or arrest, or both), it has
been generally assumed that judges with authority to hear criminal matters have that power."
Id.
21 The Kentucky Supreme Court stated in Richmond: "Strange to say, there is no
general statutory authority for the issuance of a search warrant by any officer of this
state." Id. at 644. Cf. KRS § 15.725(4) (allows clerks to issue criminal warrants during
absence of district and circuit judges and trial commissioners, but does not authorize anyone
to issue the warrants originally).
22 RCR 13.10(l) (1983).
21 637 S.W.2d at 645 ("RCR 13.10 is not the wellspring of authority for the issuance
of warrants.").
24 Id.
25 637 S.W.2d at 642.
26 Id. at 645.




to Carrollton and issued a search warrant for the automobile.29 The
defendant challenged this warrant as invalid because it was issued
outside the judge's district." In answering this contention, the
Court first held that all district and circuit judges have the authority
to issue warrants "of any kind upon a proper showing of
reasonable cause." 31 The Court reasoned that district and circuit
judges, by nature of their offices, necessarily possess "the two con-
stitutional qualifications of neutrality and capacity to determine
the existence of probable cause." 32
Richmond did not change the prevailing law by holding that
district and circuit judges are authorized to issue warrants. The
decision merely confirmed the general assumption that judges have
this power and provided explicit authority for judges to act. One
question raised by Richmond is why the Court chose to ignore
existing provisions regarding who may issue warrants. Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) section 15.725(4) states: "In the event of
the absence from a county of all district judges and all circuit judges
and all trial commissioners, the circuit clerk in each county may
issue criminal warrants .... " While this statute is not explicit, the
implication is that all district and circuit judges and trial commis-
sioners may issue warrants. Even if the Court believed an implica-
tion was not a sufficient basis for decision, it could have used the
statute as an indication of legislative intent. Instead, the Court only
mentioned the statute in relation to a minor point in a footnote.33
In addition to ignoring this statute, the Court also ignored RCr
2.04(1), which provides: "If from an examination of the complaint
it appears to the judge.., that there is probable cause to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the defendant com-
mitted it, he shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the defen-
dant .... " This rule clearly implies that judges are authorized to
issue arrest warrants. However, the Court did not mention this rule,
29 District Judge Dennis Fritz of the 12th Judicial District, consisting of Henry,
Oldham and Trimble counties, issued the search warrant. Id. at 643.
so Id. at 644.
" Id. at 645 n.2. The Court further stated: "Someone must have authority to issue
warrants, and by virtue of that necessity we confirm that all district and circuit judges
of this state have it." Id. at 645.
3 See id. at 645.
" See id. at 645 n.2.
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referring only to "[t]he absence of an explicit delegation of the
power to issue warrants." 3 Thus, while the Court's holding that
all judges may issue warrants is sound, the Court declined to note
possible existing authority for its conclusion.
B. The Territorial Efficacy of Warrants
In Richmond, the Supreme Court of Kentucky also considered
whether the power to issue warrants was constrained by territorial
limits. The Court noted that while it was settled that arrest war-
rants could be executed statewide, 3 Coleman v. Commonwealth
3 6
had indicated that search warrants could not be executed outside
the issuing officer's jurisdiction.3 7 Concluding that search warrants
may now be executed statewide, the Court distinguished Coleman
on two grounds.38
First, the Court saw no reason to treat search warrants dif-
ferently from arrest warrants, which are valid statewide. 9 Second
and more importantly, Coleman was decided before the courts were
reorganized into one Court of Justice by the 1975 Judicial Amend-
ment. The Court relied on several provisions of the Amendment40
to conclude that there is only "one District Court for the entire
state," and that all district and circuit judges are "members of the
same court and have equal capacity to act throughout the
Commonwealth." 4 ' The Court's conclusion that all warrants are
effective statewide was a significant change in the law regarding
search warrants.
" Id. at 645.
" Id. ("warrants of arrest run to the four corners of the realm").
36 292 S.W. 771 (Ky. 1927).
637 S.W.2d at 645-46 (citing 292 S.W. at 771-72).
' Id. at 646.
" Id. at 645. The Court noted:
[Warrants of arrest run to the four corners of the realm; that is, a
judge in Pikeville can issue a warrant for the arrest of a person in Hickman.
Why, then, should he not be able to warrant the search of a place in Hickman?
And if he can do this in his office at Pikeville, is there really any important
end to be accomplished by drawing a line against his signing the warrant
in Hickman or, for that matter, any other place in the state?
Id.




The holding of Richmond raises the question whether search
warrants issued by clerks pursuant to KRS section 15.725(4) will
also be valid throughout the state. The Court in its opinion
specifically referred only to warrants issued by district or circuit
judges, 42 but warrants issued by clerks will also presumably be valid
statewide, since the Court was aware of the statute authorizing
clerks to issue criminal warrants and explicitly held that criminal
warrants include search warrants.43 It could be argued that Rich-
mond obviates the need for KRS section 15.725(4). If all judicial
officers are out of the county, law enforcement personnel can get
warrants from any judge in the state and need never rely on clerks.
Generally, it is better to have judges from other districts rather than
local clerks issue warrants.
Richmond also contains at least two potential hazards. The first
is that law enforcement officers, now free to get warrants anywhere
in the Commonwealth, may shop around among judicial districts
to find the most favorable judge.4 4 The second hazard is the poten-
tial for conflict among judges of different districts and different
circuits. If either of these problems arises, the Court may need to
rethink its position, but generally this statewide approach to war-
rants seems acceptable since the use of warrants by police is
desirable and this decision facilitates the procurement of warrants.
II. COMPETENCY OF COUNSEL
In Henderson v. Commonwealth,45 the Supreme Court finally
abandoned the "farce and mockery" test" for evaluating the per-
formance of defense attorneys on claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel.47 The Court overruled cases which had held that only
41 Id. at 646.
41 Id. at 645 n.2.
" As a practical matter, judge shopping on warrants may be minimal because such
conduct by law enforcement personnel carries the risk of irritating the judge who regular-
ly presides over their cases.
4' 636 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1982).
41 See, e.g., Wahl v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Ky. 1965) ("In order
to vacate the judgment because of poor representation of [court appointed] counsel, we
must find that the circumstances of the representation were such as to shock the conscience
of the court and to render the proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice."), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 976 (1966). See generally Comment, Kentucky's Standard for Ineffective
Counsel: A Farce and a Mockery?, 63 Ky. L.J. 803 (1974-75).
11 636 S.W.2d at 650.
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when the level of representation was such as to "shock the cons-
cience" and render the proceedings a "farce and mockery" would
such representation constitute "ineffective assistance,'"4  and held
the proper standard was one of ordinary negligence. 9 The Court
stated: "[W]e conclude that as an adequate standard the defense
counsel should be required to perform at least as well as a lawyer
with ordinary training and skill in criminal law, utilizing that degree
of training to conscientiously protect his client's interests." 50 The
Court then reviewed the evidence in light of the new standard and
found that the representation was reasonably effective.'
Several observations about Henderson are in order. First, the
Court adopted the test of Beasley v. United States,52 "reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance,""
yet stated the holding in terms of ordinary negligence.5" The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided Beasley in 1974, borrow-
ing the above language from the Fifth Circuit." While Beasley in-
volved a federal prosecution, the decision is one of constitutional
law-a construction of the Sixth Amendment 56-and has been ap-
plied to state convictions reviewed in the federal courts on peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus.57 Thus the Beasley formulation has
been the operative test for federal review of Kentucky convictions
for almost a decade, and it was sensible for the Kentucky Supreme
Court to adopt the same standard.58
" See, ag., Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1974); Wahl v.
Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 774.
41 636 S.W.2d at 650.
s, Id.
11 Id. at 651.
52 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 696. "We hold that the assistance of counsel required under the Sixth Amend-
ment is counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance."
Id.
I 5 636 S.W.2d at 650 (citing Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979) (an attorney malpractice case)).
11 491 F.2d at 694 (quoting MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961), modified on other grounds, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1961)).
5, See id.
', See, e.g., Gilbert v. Sowders, 646 F.2d 1146, 1150 (6th Cir. 1981); Canary v.
Bland, 583 F.2d 887, 889 (6th Cir. 1978); Wilson v. Cowan, 578 F.2d 166, 168 (6th Cir.
1978).
" In a case decided soon after Beasley, Kentucky's highest court refused to
acknowledge Beasley as controlling authority. Perkins v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W.2d
873, 874 n.1 (Ky. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975). The appellate courts of Ken-
1983-84]
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The Beasley formulation, however, implies that a reviewing
court must determine not only that the attorney performed com-
petently but also that the attorney was likely, by preparation, train-
ing and experience, to render competent service. s9 While prepara-
tion, training and experience unquestionably are factors to be con-
sidered in determining the adequacy of an attorney's performance,
it would make no sense to reverse a conviction where an ill-prepared
lawyer unexpectedly did an adequate, or more than adequate, job.
However, the court in Beasley made it clear that the focus should
be on the attorney's performance in the case at bar.60 There is no
reported case from the Sixth Circuit reversing a conviction because
the attorney was not "reasonably likely to render . . . effective
assistance"; the issue has always been whether the attorney in fact
did "render reasonably effective assistance." 6' That portion of the
Beasley formulation which looks to the likelihood of the attorney
performing competently is misleading and has been rightly
disregarded by the courts. Because the decisions of the Sixth Cir-
cuit on matters of federal constitutional law are defacto controlling
in Kentucky state courts,62 the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted
tucky did apply the farce and mockery test in later cases but added that, in any case,
the level of representation satisfied Beasley. See, e.g., Bishop v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d
519, 523 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
,1 See 491 F.2d at 696.
60 Id.
6 See, e.g., Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir.) (attorneys presented guilty
plea without petitioner's acquiesence), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1091 (1981); Gilbert v. Sowders,
646 F.2d at 1150 (petitioner's due process violated when case dismissed in state court
because of procedural error by attorney); McKeldin v. Rose, 631 F.2d 458, 460-61 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 969 (1981) (attorney's failure to appear in preliminary
hearing held harmless mistake); Canary v. Bland, 583 F.2d at 889 (attorney failed to
challenge the use of petitioner's previous criminal record in sentence calculation); Wilson
v. Cowan, 578 F.2d at 168 (attorney failed to call on witness able to prove petitioner's
absence when armed robbery took place).
612 The truth of this proposition may be illustrated by reference to habeas corpus
proceedings. Federal courts are empowered by federal statute to issue writs of habeas
corpus to state prisoners whose convictions were obtained in violation of the United States
Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(a) (1976). The granting of a writ of habeas corpus by
a federal court is in fact a reversal of a state court decision. Cf. Stumbo v. Seabold,
704 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1983) (reversing a federal district court that denied a writ of
habeas corpus and ordering the state to either release the petitioner or retry him in 90 days).
If the state court were to follow a different standard for determining whether the
assistance of counsel had been effective, it would risk being reversed through habeas cor-
pus proceedings. In Canary v. Bland, 583 F.2d 887, this very thing occured. The defend-
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the Beasley formulation while making it clear that the test is one
of ordinary negligence. 63
Assuming the attorney's performance is substandard, must the
defendant establish that his defense was "prejudiced" thereby?
Though the Beasley court stated that ineffective assistance of
counsel could not be considered harmless error," it is reasonably
clear that the Sixth Circuit will not set aside a conviction unless
the attorney's derelictions are substantial.65 While Beasley
nominally does not permit a harmless error analysis, it does per-
mit a review of the entire record to see if the attorney's perfor-
mance, taken as a whole, was deficient.66 This approach precludes
reversals for minor errors and is consistent with a negligence stan-
dard, in which the complainant has the burden of showing that
the conduct of the attorney resulted in injury.67 The Kentucky high
court has stated that it will not reverse for an attorney error
characterized as "non-prejudicial." 6 This position is consistent
with the only statement on the matter by the United States Supreme
Court.69
It is possible, however, that the courts will ultimately adopt
a test which will require only that the defendant show substantial
ant in Canary had been convicted of being a habitual criminal after his attorney failed to
object to the use of an earlier conviction to prove the charge. Id. at 890-91. The claim of
ineffective assistance based on the attorney's failure to raise the objection was rejected by
the Kentucky Supreme Court because the "counsel's failure did not reduce the trial to the
level of a 'farce and a mockery of justice.' " Id. at 889.
On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, noting the Sixth Circuit
no longer followed the farce and mockery test with respect to sixth amendment claims.
Id. at 889, 891.
"1 636 S.W.2d at 650. Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (the
test is "whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases").
11 491 F.2d at 696.
'5 Cf. United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863 (6th Cir.) (attorney's conduct was
reasonable as seen in the light of total circumstances), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978).
11 See Roland v. Mintzes, 554 F. Supp. 881, 888-89 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (quoting United
States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d at 865-66).
6? Cf. Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d at 12 (malpractice of attorney judged by
ordinary standard of care used by legal profession).
" See McHenry v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Ky. 1973) (an attorney
has discretion in selecting the trial strategy he deems most reasonable at the time).
69 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54 (1975) (court will defer to state record
regarding quality of counsel's representation).
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attorney negligence, with the burden then shifting to the state to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.70
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case
where the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed a con-
viction by presuming ineffectiveness and prejudice from a lack of
both experience and adequate time to prepare.7' The forthcoming
opinion may be helpful in providing guidelines for the appointment
of counsel," but it is doubtful that the Court will uphold the rever-
sal of a conviction where the petitioner could not point to any
specific error.
As appropriate cases arise, it would be helpful to the trial courts
for the Kentucky Supreme Court to provide specific criteria by
which to judge the competence of defense counsel. For example,
in Washington v. Strickland,3 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the general problem of alleged failure to investigate in
the context of five common fact patterns." ' The hornbook type
analysis in Washington should greatly help trial judges decide
whether a given attorney's performance was deficient.
70 This approach, titled the requirement of "actual and substantial detriment," was
developed in Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1262 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S.Ct. 2451 (1982) and is favorably commented on in Note, A New Focus on Prejudice
in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases: The Assertion of Rights Standard, 21 Am.
CaIM. L. REv. 29, 41-43 (1983).
' See United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982) (court appointed attor-
ney who specialized in real estate to represent a criminal defendant and allowed only a short
time to prepare), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 1182 (1983).
" See Slonim, How Effective Does a Criminal Defense Have to Be? 69 A.B.A.
J. 1030 (1983).
" 693 F.2d at 1243.
7, The court categorized and analyzed the situations as follows:
[1] [C]ounsel fails to conduct substantial investigation into the one
plausible line of defense in the case .... [2] [C]ounsel conducts a reasonably
substantial investigation into the one line of defense that is presented at trial.
• . . [3] [C]ounsel conducts a reasonably substantial investigation into all
plausible lines of defense and chooses to rely upon fewer than all of them
at trial. . . . [4] [C]ounsel fails to conduct a substantial investigation into
one plausible line of defense because of his reasonable strategic choice to
rely upon another plausible line of defense at trial. . . . [5] [Cqounsel fails
to conduct a substantial investigation into plausible lines of defense for reasons
other than strategic choice.
Id. at 1252-58.
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III. PRE-TRuL DISCOVERY OF WITNESS STATEMIENTS
Prior to the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Wright v.
Commonwealth15 it was clear that a prosecutor could not be re-
quired to give witness statements to defense counsel before trial.
RCr 7.24(2) states that a trial court may order the attorney for the
Commonwealth to produce certain things for inspection but, "[t]his
provision does not authorize pretrial discovery or inspection of
reports, memoranda, or other documents made by officers and
agents of the commonwealth in connection with the investigation
or prosecution of the case, or of statements made t6 them by-
witnesses or by prospective witnesses." '76 Prior decisions of the
Court had held that witness statements are not discoverable under
this rule.
7
In Wright, however, the Court held that it is within the discre-
tion of the trial court to order the pre-trial production of prosecu-
tion witness statements.78 In so holding, the Court relied on RCr
7.26, a rule which is limited on its face to the production of witness
statements at trial." Prior to 1981, RCr 7.26 had provided that
after a witness for the prosecution testified on direct examination,
the court could order the prosecutor to give defense counsel any
prior statements of the witness.8 0 In 1981, the Court modified RCr
7.26(1) to provide that "[blefore a witness called by the Com-
monwealth testifies on direct examination the attorney for the Com-
monwealth shall produce any statement of the witness ... for ex-
amination and use by the defendant." 8' These changes were
designed to: (1) eliminate the ritual motion to the court for pro-
duction; (2) enable the defense attorney to spot inconsistencies in
7, 637 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1982).
16 RCR 7.24(2).
11 See, e.g., Moore v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 426, 431 (1982).
" See 637 S.W.2d at 636.
" RCR 7.26.
10 See RCR 7.26(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (amended 1981). That rule corresponded to
the practice in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), the so-called 'Jencks Act,'
passed by Congress in response to Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). The
Jencks Act has been superseded by FED. R. Calm. P. 26.2 [hereinafter cited as FRCRPI
providing for discovery of the statements of all witnesses (other than the defendant) after
direct examination.
1' RcR 7.26(1) (1981) (emphasis added).
1983-84]
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testimony by putting the statement in his hands during direct ex-
amination; and (3) eliminate the break between direct and cross
for the reading of the witness's statement." The change was not
designed to give a court discretion to order pre-trial discovery of
witness statements, a practice specifically prohibited by RCr 7.24.
The Court in Wright stated that the modification of RCr
7.26(1) was in response to the 1981 proposal of the Judicial Council
for a discovery rule similar to Rule 422 of the Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure.8 3 The Council had proposed that the defense
attorney have access to the prosecutor's entire file, including witness
statements, but excluding attorney work product.8 4 The Council
would also have required the prosecutor to give written notice of
the names and addresses of witnesses and their criminal records.8
While the Supreme Court rejected these proposals it did provide
for the discovery of grand jury testimony, 6 a change clearly in-
tended to allow additional discovery. While the absence of official
commentary makes statutory construction difficult, 7 the change
in RCr 7.26 was likely not intended as an ancillary means of ob-
taining pre-trial discovery of witnesses' statements.
The Wright decision invites routine defense motions for witness
statements, but provides no direction for the exercise of discretion
by the trial court.8 8 Is it an abuse of discretion to deny pre-trial
discovery on the ground that the defendant has failed to
demonstrate a particularized need for the material? Is it an abuse
of discretion to make the discovery order reciprocal? Is it an abuse
of discretion simply to deny pre-trial discovery under the authori-
ty of the prohibition in RCr 7.24? Unless Wright is overruled, the
8" Plymale & McSwain, Developments in Criminal Procedure: RCR 7.26, An Open
File Discovery Rule? 47 BENCH & BAR 14 (1983).
' 637 S.W.2d at 636.
'" See RCa 7.32 (Proposed Official Draft 1981). See also UNIFORM RULS oF CRmNAL
PROCEDURE 421, 10 U.L.A. 114 (1974).
" See RCR 7.34 (Proposed Official Draft 1981). See also UNiFoRm RULES OF CRM MNAL
PROCEDURE 422(b)(2) 10 U.L.A. 120 (1974) (a statement of the name, address and occupa-
tion of each intended witness must be furnished, upon request, to the attorney for the
defendant).
86 See RCR 5.16(l), (3).
87 The Criminal Rules Advisory Committee included a proposed "Official Commen-
tary" but was not adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Fortune, Criminal Rules,
70 Ky. L.J. 395, 396 (1981-82).
" See Plymale & McSwain, supra note 82, at 58-59.
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rules are changed, or specific guidance is provided, the Court will
have to answer these questions.
IV. VENUE
When a criminal offense is committed in more than one
county, venue is proper in either county under the Kentucky
statute.89 Thus, the prosecutor may choose the county in which to
proceed.9" Recently the Kentucky Supreme Court considered, in
Evans v. Commonwealth,9 ' whether trial courts have authority to
supersede the prosecutor's choice and transfer a criminal case to
another county where venue is proper for the convenience of par-
ties and witnesses.92
Evans v. Commonwealth arose when Evans, a doctor practic-
ing in Bell County, and Thomas, a dentist practicing in Clay
County, were separately indicted for Medicaid fraud. 3 Indictments
were returned in Franklin County since part of the crime was com-
mitted in that county when the defendants submitted their
fraudulent claims to the Commonwealth. The circuit court agreed
that venue was proper in Franklin County, but determined that
venue was also proper and more appropriate in the doctors' home
counties for the convenience of the parties and witnesses.9" The cir-
cuit court then entered an order transferring the two cases from
Franklin County to Bell and Clay Counties, respectively. The court
of appeals, with one judge dissenting, held this transfer to be im-
proper because of the absence of statutory authority. 9
The Kentucky Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals
" See KRS § 452.550 (1983) ("When an offense is committed partly in one and partly
in another county, or if acts and their effects constituting an offense occur in different
counties, the prosecution may be in either county in which any of such acts occurs.").
11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Evans, 645 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982),
aff'd, 645 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1983).
645 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1983).
92 Id. at 347. The transfer of a case from one site where venue is proper to a dif-
ferent site where venue is proper for the convenience of the parties and witnesses is refer-
red to as a transfer based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See, e.g., id. at 347.
This term will be used throughout this portion of the article to refer to such transfers.
11 Id. at 346. The defendants were indicted under KRS §§ 194.505(6), 205.850(4),
514.040(1)(a) (1983).
, See Commonwealth v. Evans, 645 S.W.2d at 351.
Id. at 350.
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that the transfer of these cases was an abuse of discretion.96 The
Court concluded that authority for a change of venue can only be
conferred by statute; a court has no inherent power to order a
forum non conveniens transfer of venue in criminal cases." The
Court then examined the applicable statute and decided it did not
authorize the trial judge to transfer prosecutions to other coun-
ties for convenience.98 The Court further stated that even if
transfers of venue were characterized as procedural and therefore
within the province of the judiciary, such transfers would have to
be mandated by rule to insure uniform use and application
throughout the system.99 Since no statute or rule authorized the
change of venue, the trial court had no authority to transfer the
cases on a theory of forum non conveniens.'00
This conclusion that a trial court is without inherent power
to alter venue for convenience is unique to criminal cases. In civil
cases, the doctrine of forum non conveniens has been recognized
without authority in statutes or rules to allow the trial judge to
dismiss a case if the forum is inconvenient and another more con-
venient forum is available.'"' This contrast between criminal and
96 Evans v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.2d at 347.
97 Id.
9' Id.
KRS 452.550 means only that certain offenses are indictable and may be
prosecuted in either county. Once an indictment is returned, however, the
statute does not purport to empower a trial judge of that particular circuit
to transfer the prosecution to another county, as if the indictment had been
returned there in the first instance.
Id. See note 89 supra for the relevant provisions of KRS 452.550.
11 645 S.W.2d at 347 ("Even if it were assumed that venue is a procedural matter
and thus comes within the judicial province, it would be necessary that an appropriate
rule of procedure be promulgated for uniform use and application throughout the system.").
1"0 Two justices dissented from the decision. Justice Aker thought the appeal was
improper procedurally. See id. at 348 (Aker, J., dissenting). Justice Sternberg also believed
the procedural propriety of the appeal was improper, but agreed with the majority on
the venue issue. See id. at 349 (Sternberg, J., dissenting). Justice Sternberg concluded
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be applied in criminal cases to insure
the defendant a fair trial. See id. at 350. However, the defendant's constitutional right
to a fair trial was not implicated here as the defendant did not claim he would receive
an unfair trial in Franklin County, but only that he would receive an inconvenient trial
in Franklin County. See id. at 347. Furthermore, if the defendant had raised a valid fair
trial claim, an existing statute would have allowed the court to transfer the action. See
KRS § 452.210 (1983).
10, See, e.g., Carter v. Netherton, 302 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1957); Alien v. Appalachian
Regional Hosps., Inc., 30 Ky. L. SUMm. 7, at 6 (Ky. Ct. App. June 3, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as KLS].
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civil practice was noted in Judge Wilhoit's dissent in the court of
appeals where he stated that forum non conveniens had not been
applied to criminal cases only because "the circumstances surround-
ing a criminal prosecution would very rarely present a situation
justifying application of the doctrine."" 2 Judge Wilhoit concluded
that there was no reason why forum non conveniens should not
be recognized in the rare criminal cases where the principles of the
doctrine would apply." 3
The Supreme Court did not directly address the question of
why a change of venue on forum non conveniens grounds is within
the trial judge's inherent powers in civil but not criminal cases. One
distinction between the doctrine as it operates in civil cases and the
issue in Evans is that in civil cases, the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens merely allows a trial judge to dismiss an action if another
more convenient forum is available, 0 4 whereas the judge in Evans
attempted affirmatively to transfer the cases to other courts. 05 The
Supreme Court found this distinction significant. It stated that
forum non conveniens was not a good model for a change of venue
because it "provides a basis on which one court may decline to
entertain a case, but does not enable that court to force another
court to take it."' 0 6
Evans establishes that Kentucky trial courts have no inherent
authority to transfer criminal cases for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses.' 07 The Court stated such authority can only
"' Commonwealth v. Evans, 645 S.W.2d at 353 (Wilhoit, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Wilhoit, J., dissenting).
,0, See Carter v. Netherton, 302 S.W.2d, at 384; Allen v. Appalachian Regional
Hosps., Inc., 30 KLS 7, at 6.
10 Evans v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.2d at 646.
0I Id. The reliance of the Supreme Court on this distinction suggests that although
a trial court clearly cannot transfer a criminal case, it might have discretion to dismiss
the case on a forum non conveniens basis. Of course, as a practical matter, dismissing
a case where venue is also available in another forum and transferring the case to that
other forum amount to the same thing, at least where the prosecutor wants to continue
with the case.
,07 This holding is consistent with the common law view. See People v. Harris, 4
Denio 150 (N.Y. 1847), quoted in People v. Jackson, 341 N.W.2d 253 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983):
We must look, therefore, to the established practice of the courts on
this subject; which is, to allow a suggestion, and make an order, when it
clearly appears, that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county
where the indictment was found. The convenience of the prosecutor, the
accused, or the witnesses, has never been allowed, either here or in England,
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be conferred by statute or perhaps by rule.' 8 As such, the deci-
sion limits the discretion of trial courts. The question raised by.the
decision is whether such discretion is desirable.' °9
The impact of allowing such transfers would be felt in two
ways. First, the prosecutor's power would be limited because his
or her choice of forum would no longer be final. Of course, the
prosecutor's choice of forum is already limited, both by the statute
which provides that venue is proper only where part of the crime
occurs"' and by the defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial. I ' There is no justification for further limiting the prosecutor's
choice of forum merely for the convenience of the defendant." '
The second impact of granting trial courts the power to transfer
criminal cases for the convenience of parties and witnesses would
be to invite conflict among the trial judges. All trial court judges
in Kentucky are elected officers, and the temptation to transfer a
politically unattractive case to someone else's docket might be ir-
resistible. Likewise, it might be tempting to transfer cases that are
particularly long and complex. Of course, the recipients of such
cases might not be pleased with the transfer and might even con-
sider transferring them back. Thus, the possibility exists that ap-
plication of the forum non conveniens doctrine in criminal cases
would end up encouraging political transfers and conflict within
the judiciary. Considering the only marginal benefit to the
as a ground of changing the place of trial in a criminal case; and we do
not feel ourselves at liberty to make such a precedent. The statute has not
introduced a new rule, the practice has been the same since 1830, that it
was before that time.
Id. at 152.
The conclusion that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply in criminal
cases is also consistent with the holdings of other state courts. See, e.g., People v. Jackson,
341 N.W.2d at 256; Seaton v. State, 29 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930).
,"' See Evans v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.2d at 347.
109 Cf. FRCRP 21(b) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the in-
terest of justice, the court upon motion of the defendant may transfer the proceedings
as to him or any one or more of the courts thereof to another district.").
110 See KRS § 452.550.
"' See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Ky. CONST. § 11. See also KRS § 452.210 (1983) (grants
the trial court authority to transfer a criminal action if it appears that the defendant or
Commonwealth cannot receive a fair trial where it is pending).
I" As a practical matter, application of forum non conveniens would promote only
the defendant's choice of forum because presumably the prosecution would have made
a convenient choice when it filed the action.
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defendant-an allegedly more convenient forum-the better policy
is not to adopt a statute or rule authorizing forum non conveniens
transfers in criminal cases.
V. BELATED ATTACKS ON CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
The Supreme Court of Kentucky used Gross v.
Commonwealth"3 and Alvey v. Commonwealth' 4 to establish rules
for trial courts to use in deciding whether to dismiss, without an
evidentiary hearing, belated attacks on criminal convictions." 5 The
recurring pattern is a conviction (by plea of guilty or otherwise),
followed by probation or eventual parole, and then a second felony
conviction, with a persistent felony offender conviction resulting
from the second conviction. This is followed by an attack on the
first conviction in an attempt to undermine the persistent felony
offender conviction." 6 The attack may take the form of a Ken-
tucky Civil Rule (CR) 60.02'' motion in the court of the first
conviction"' or a RCr 11.421" motion in the court of either the
first or second conviction.'20
In Gross the Court pointed out that errors are to be corrected,
if possible, on direct appeal, and if that is not possible, by a motion
pursuant to RCr 11.42. 21 An individual filing a CR 60.02 motion
13 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983).
648 S.W.2d 858 (Ky. 1983).
'" Gross and Alvey were two of seven cases consolidated for oral argument. 648
S.W.2d at 853.
2,6 See, e.g., Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d at 853; Ray v. Commonwealth,
633 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
,,1 KY. R. Civ. P. 60.02 [hereinafter cited as CR] provides that a trial court may
grant relief from a final judgment for (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence; (c) perjury or falsified evidence; (d) fraud affect-
ing the proceedings other than perjury or falsified evidence; (e) the judgment is void,
satisfied, or a prior judgment on which it is based has been reversed; and f) any other
reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief. A motion for relief on the first three
grounds must be made within a year of judgment. CR 60.02 is made applicable to criminal
proceedings by RCR 13.04.
"' See, e.g., Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d at 853.
RCR 11.42(1) provides that a prisoner in custody or a defendant on probation,
parole or conditional discharge who claims that the judgment of conviction is subject
to collateral attack may move for relief in the court that imposed the sentence.
Alvey v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d at 858.
648 S.W.2d at 856.
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must explain the failure to raise the matter by appeal or RCr 11.42
motion.' The Court declared:
The structure provided in Kentucky for attacking the final
judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not haphazard and
overlapping, but is organized and complete. That structure is set
out in the rules related to direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and
thereafter in CR 60.02. CR 60.02 is not intended merely as an
additional opportunity to raise Boykin defenses. It is for relief
that is not available by direct appeal and not available under RCr
11.42. The movant must demonstrate why he is entitled to this
special, extraordinary relief. Before the movant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing, he must affirmatively allege facts which, if
true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege special cir-
cumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.'23
The Court then explicitly held that failure to raise a matter by
direct appeal or RCr 11.42 motion normally forecloses considera-
tion of a CR 60.02 motion. The Court stated:
We hold that the proper procedure for a defendant aggrieved
by a judgment in a criminal case is to directly appeal that judg-
ment, stating every ground of error which it is reasonable to ex-
pect that he or his counsel is aware of when the appeal is taken.
Next, we hold that a defendant is required to avail himself
of RCr 11.42 while in custody under sentence or on probation,
parole or conditional discharge, as to any ground of which he
is aware, or should be aware, during the period when this remedy
is available to him. Final disposition of that motion, or waiver
of the opportunity to make it, shall conclude all issues that
reasonably could have been presented in that proceeding. The
language of RCr 11.42 forecloses the defendant from raising any
questions under CR 60.02 which are "issues that could
reasonably have been presented" by RCr 11.42 proceedings. 2
The Supreme Court adopted and released the court of appeals
opinion in Alvey to make it clear that a defendant facing a per-
sistent felony offender charge who wishes to claim that the prior
conviction is invalid must do so at the time he or she is tried as
a persistent felon.' 25 A failure to raise the matter during the trial
, Id. at 856.
323 Id. (emphasis in original).
, Id. at 857.
125 See Alvey v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d at 858.
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will foreclose the defendant from raising it by a motion pursuant
to RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02. 26 In Alvey the defendant claimed that
the record of his earlier conviction did not show that he knowingly
and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty. 27 Assuming the record
was deficient under the rationale of Boykin v. Alabama,'28 the
Court held the defect waived by the failure of counsel to make a
timely objection during the persistent felony proceeding. 29 As a
practical matter, this means defense attorneys must question their
clients about the circumstances of convictions charged in a persis-
tent felony offender indictment, obtain the court records of the
previous convictions if necessary, and file an appropriate motion
attacking any convictions which are potentially voidable. 3 '
Alvey and Gross do not address the problems which arise if
the conviction under attack occurred in a court different from the
court handling the persistent felony offender proceeding. The
defense attorney might file a motion to vacate in the court which
rendered the conviction; the issue then would be whether the forum
court should stay the proceedings pending a resolution.
Alternatively, the defense attorney might file a motion to suppress
in the second court;' 3' the issue then would be whether the second
court should rule on the validity of the conviction or transfer the
matter to the first court.
VI. RiGHT TO TALK TO AN TTORNEY BEFORiE DECiDiNG WHETHER
TO TAKE A BREATHALYZER TEST
RCr 2.14 provides that a person in custody shall have the right
to "make communications as soon as practicable for the purpose
"I Id. at 859.
127 Id.
-28 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) (waivers cannot be presumed from a silent record;
the record must show an affirmative waiver of the right to trial by jury, the privilege
against self-incrimination, and the right to confront one's accusers). But cf. North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 29 n.3 (1970) (if it is established that the defendant was made
aware of his rights by his attorney no issues of substance under Boykin would be presented).
29 Alvey v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d at 860.
130 A defense attorney could forgo a pre-trial motion and simply object at trial to
proof of the prior conviction, since the criminal rules do not require that matters requir-
ing evidentiary hearings be raised prior to trial. See RCR 9.78.
'" RCR 11.42(9) requires that original applications for relief of the nature of that
set out in RCR 11.42 are to be transferred to the sentencing court. CR 60.03 (1954) preserves
the right of a party to bring an independent action seeking relief from judgment.
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of securing the services of an attorney."'' 32 Following his arrest for
driving under the influence of alcohol, Robert Elkin sought per-
mission to call his attorney for advice on whether to submit to a
breathalyzer test urged on him by the arresting officer. 33 The of-
ficer refused to let Elkin make the call, and Elkin insisted that he
would not take the test until he talked to his lawyer. This stan-
doff was resolved by the officer treating Elkin's actions as an un-
warranted refusal to take the test, a position that was subsequently
upheld by the Department of Transportation in suspending Elkin's
license.' 34
On appeal, the court of appeals held there is no right to con-
sult counsel before deciding whether to submit to a breathalyzer
test.' 35 The court relied on Newman v. Hacker,'36 a 1975 case which
held there is no right to have counsel present during the administra-
tion of a breathalyzer test.' 37 Elkin attempted to avoid Hacker by
arguing that the right to have an attorney present is distinct from
the right to consult an attorney, but the court of appeals concluded
that no real difference exists between the two.' 38
There is a vital difference, however, between submitting to the
test and deciding whether to take the test. The difference is between
passive cooperation and active decisionmaking. In Hacker the
Court stated that such procedures as fingerprinting and taking
blood and breath samples are not critical stages of a proceeding
for purposes of the sixth amendment right to counsel.' 39 Unques-
tionably the state can force an individual to yield a blood or breath
sample-if there is probable cause of driving under the influence.'""
The Kentucky statute, however, does not authorize the taking of
a blood or breath sample by force, but rather gives the accused
the choice of submitting to a test or risking suspension of his or
her license for up to six months.'' Since there is no guarantee that
RCR 2.14.
Elkin v. Commonwealth, 646 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
13. Id. at 46. KRS § 186.565(4) (1980) provides for suspension of an operator's license
for up to six months for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test.
646 S.W.2d at 46-47.
136 530 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1975).
131 Id. at 377.
131 646 S.W.2d at 47.
"1 530 S.W.2d at 377. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765-66 (1966).
140 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 760-66.
1,5 See KRS § 186.565(4).
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the individual will be permitted to keep his or her license by con-
senting to the test,'4 2 and since the results of the test will be ad-
missible in court, 3 the accused is faced with a difficult choice.' 44
The courts of several states have recognized a statutory right
to the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to submit to a
breathalyzer test.'4 5 In excluding evidence obtained in violation of
a statutory right to counsel, the Alaska Supreme Court stated:
[Tihe law has deliberately given the arrested person a choice be-
tween two very different alternatives and potential sanctions. The
arrested driver must weigh and evaluate a number of different
factors. He may only be vaguely aware of some of these and need
not be informed of all of them by the police.
The decision as to whether to comply with an arresting of-
ficer's request to take a sobriety test is not a simple one. Clearly,
an attorney's advice at this stage would not only be ethical and
lawful, but helpful.... Where the important chemical testing
procedures are not unreasonably delayed, the driver should, upon
request, have the benefit of the advice of his own counsel, with
whom he has a statutory right to communicate.' 46
Kentucky also provides a statutory right to communicate with
counsel after arrest. " 7 While the Kentucky appellate courts have
held that there is no constitutional right to counsel, 4 ' it is not clear
"' The operator's license may also be suspended if he or she is convicted of driving
under the influence. Id.
.' Id. KRS § 189.520 (1968) establishes a presumption of intoxication for a person
with a blood alcohol level of 0.10 alcohol by weight or above.
144 "We recognize, of course, that the choice to submit or refuse to take a blood-
alcohol test will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make." South Dakota
v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916, 923 (1983). In Neville the Court held that a state may introduce
evidence of an individual's refusal to take the test as proof of his intoxication, but the
Court rejected the contention that the privilege against self-incrimination barred such com-
ment. Id. at 923.
"I See, e.g., Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983); Prideaux v. State, 247
N.W.2d 385, 391 (Minn. 1976).
"1 659 P.2d at 1213.
"47 See RCR 2.14.
"I Newman v. Hacker, 530 S.W.2d at 376; Elkin v. Commonwealth, 646 S.W.2d
at 45. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel under the sixth amend-
ment attaches at the commencement of formal proceedings, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682 (1972), and that prior to the commencement of judicial proceedings the right to counsel
to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination attaches only in situations of custodial
interrogations. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); Beckwith v. United States,
425 U.S. 341 (1976); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court has further
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that the courts have considered the argument that denial of the
statutory right to counsel provides a defense to a proceeding to sus-
pend an operator's license. For these reasons, the court should
reconsider its decision in Elkin.
An additional argument, apparently not raised in Elkin, is that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the
assistance of counsel in a proceeding brought by the state when
the issues are complex and the consequences of error are severe. 49
Assuming there is no undue delay'50 it does not appear that the
state has any legitimate interest in preventing the suspect from talk-
ing to an attorney. On the other hand, the suspect has a substan-
tial interest at stake and clearly would benefit from an attorney's
advice. It is not suggested that the state is required to secure counsel
for the indigent,' 11 only that the police should not stand in the way
of legitimate attorney-client communications.
held that the privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by forcing a suspect to
choose whether to take the breathalyzer test. South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. at 916.
149 Cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (appointment
of counsel on a case-by-case basis in proceedings to terminate parental rights); Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (appointment of counsel on case-by-case basis in pro-
ceedings to revoke probation).
"s See State v. Fitzsimmons, 610 P.2d 893, 900 (Wash. 1980).
,s But see id. at 896 (holding that in some circumstances there is a constitutional
right to appointed counsel under the sixth amendment).
